Yo, sustancia y causas
Notas sobre la metafísica kantiana
Resumen
The kantian critique of so-called "dogmatic metaphysics" is firstly founded on the familiar grounds invoked by the empirical minds of the Age of Enlightenment. Yet dogmatic metaphysics was not for Kant bad philosophy on account of being metaphysics at all, but because of being bad metaphysics. The transcendental philosopy aimed indeed at establishing a new metaphysical propaedeutic wich could answer problematic sceptical objections. In my paper I address the three chapters of the Kantian metaphysical attempt which are concerned with the I, the substantial world and causality. The nuclear element of my reconstruction is transcendental selfconsciousness. Based on this concept, and after analyzing and weighing up the philosophical turn it involves, I restructure the metaphysical Kantian justification of our reliance on the persistent reality of things and on their causal connections.
